Security is based on the hardness of the problem of factoring an integer n that is the product of two primes p and q of the same bitlength.
In 1985, n could be factored in subexponential time 2 (log n) 1/2 (using the 'quadratic sieve' algorithm).
Consequence: For a 64-bit level of security, one needed n ≈ 2 512 .
Fully exponential time: 2 c(log n) = n c [terribly inefficient]
Subexponential time: 2 (log n) c [inefficient, but not terribly so]
Polynomial time: (log n) c [efficient] -3
Finite Fields
Let q = p m be a prime power.
There is a unique finite field F q of size q.
Example: Prime Fields F p Integers modulo p: Z p = {0, 1, 2, . . . , p − 1}.
Example: Binary Fields F 2 m
Binary polynomials modulo an irreducible polynomial.
The nonzero elements of F q form a cyclic group F * q of size q − 1.
Let g be an element of order n in F q (where n divides q − 1). Then g = {g 0 , g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g n−1 } is a group of size n.
Diffie-Hellman
Invented by Diffie and Hellman in 1976. Let g be an element of order n in F q , and let G = g .
The finite field DLP: Given h ∈ G, compute the integer
In 1985, the DLP in F * q could be solved in subexponential time 2 (log q) 1/2 (using 'index-calculus' algorithms) and in fully exponential time √ n (using Pollard's rho method).
Consequence: For a 64-bit level of security, one needed q ≈ 2 512 and n ≈ 2 128 .
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Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)
The DLP can be generalized to arbitrary cyclic groups.
Let G = g be a group of prime order n.
The DLP in G is: Given h ∈ G, compute the integer
The best generic algorithm for solving the DLP is Pollard's rho method which has a running time ≈ √ n.
Consequence: For a 64-bit level of security, one needs n ≈ 2 128 .
-6
Elliptic Curves
An elliptic curve E defined over a finite field F q is given by an equation:
The solutions (x, y), where x, y ∈ F q , to the equation form an group. This group E(F q ) has size ≈ q.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
In 1985, Koblitz and Miller proposed using the group of points on an elliptic curve in public-key cryptography.
Their proposal was motivated by two factors:
1. The lack of a subexponential-time algorithm for the DLP on elliptic curves (ECDLP).
Consequence: For a 64-bit level of security, one needs q ≈ 2 128 .
2. The large number of elliptic curves (approximately 2q) for each finite field F q .
A hyperelliptic curve C of genus g defined over a finite field F q is given by an equation:
Note that a hyperelliptic curve of genus g = 1 is precisely an elliptic curve. [Elliptic curve:
The genus is a 'measure of a curve's complexity'.
A hyperelliptic curve gives a group of size ≈ q g .
Pollard's rho method for solving the HCDLP has running time q g/2 .
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Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptography
In 1989, Koblitz proposed using groups from hyperelliptic curves in public-key cryptography.
His proposal was motivated by two factors:
1. The lack of a subexponential-time algorithm for the DLP on hyperelliptic curves (HCDLP).
Consequence: For a 64-bit level of security, one needs q g ≈ 2 128 . For example, g = 4 and q ≈ 2 32 , or g = 8 and q ≈ 2 16 .
2. The large number of hyperelliptic curves (approximately q 2g−1 ) for each finite field F q .
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Number Field Sieve (Pollard, Lenstra, Lenstra, Manasse; 1990) Subexponential-time 2 (log n) 1/3 factoring algorithm. Early Attacks on the ECDLP/HCDLP (M, Okamoto, Vanstone; 1990) Weil pairing attack: For very special elliptic curves E/F q , the ECDLP can be efficiently reduced to the DLP in the finite field F q k for some small k (where subexponential-time attacks are applicable).
[
k = embedding degree]
Example: E :
Supersingular elliptic curves have embedding degree k ≤ 6.
[Recall: Pollard's rho attack on the HCDLP has running time
(Adleman, DeMarrais, Huang; 1994) Index-calculus subexponential 2 (log q g )
1/2 attack for very high genus hyperelliptic curves ((2g + 1) 0.98 ≥ q).
(Araki, Satoh, Semaev, Smart; 1997 ) Smart-ASS attack: For elliptic curves E/F p of size p, the ECDLP can be solved very efficiently.
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Ramifications
Many cryptographers and practitioners were traumatized by these attacks on the ECDLP and HCDLP.
Their fears were somewhat alleviated by prohibiting the weak curves from emerging ECC standards:
◮ Example: IEEE P1363 and ANSI X9.62 draft stanards required that k ≥ 20 (thus excluding all supersingular elliptic curves).
But many experts remained skeptical about the security of both supersingular and ordinary elliptic curves.
In May 1997, RSA Security posted ECC Central on their web site.
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Ron Rivest (1997) "Elliptic curves show promise as an alternative basis on which to implement public-key cryptography. They are a plausible "back-up" to RSA in case someone should discover a fast integer factorization algorithm. And in some applications their apparent ability to utilize smaller public keys might be of interest."
"But the security of cryptosystems based on elliptic curves is not well understood, due in large part to the abstruse nature of elliptic curves. Few cryptographers understand elliptic curves, so there is not the same widespread understanding and consensus concerning the security of elliptic curves that RSA enjoys...."
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Ron Rivest (1997) "...Over time, this may change, but for now trying to get an evaluation of the security of an elliptic-curve cryptosystem is a bit like trying to get an evaluation of some recently discovered Chaldean poetry. Until elliptic curves have been further studied and evaluated, I would advise against fielding any large-scale applications based on them."
"As elliptic curves begin to receive the kind of stringent review already received by RSA, they will (if they are not broken) be added to RSA's toolkits and recommended for small-scale or short-term applications. In the end, time will tell how well they stand up to attack." "It is correct that I am suspicious of elliptic curve cryptosystems. ....."
"I suspect that the lack of a sub-exponential algorithm is merely a matter of neglect...."
"I am fortified in this opinion by the fact that the Jacobians of hyperelliptic curve were also suggested for cryptography.... Nonetheless Ming-Deh Huang, Jonathan DeMarrais and I were able to show that for 'high genus' hyperelliptic curves a subexponential algorithm does exist."
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Standardized Elliptic Curves 
◮ "XTR is not affected by the uncertainty still marring ECC"
◮ ECSTR: Elliptic Curves Still Too Risky -19
XTR and Supersingular Elliptic Curves
◮ Let b ∈ F p 2 be a square but not a cube.
◮ The elliptic curve E/F p 2 : Y 2 = X 3 + b is supersingular and #E(F p 2 ) = p 2 − p + 1.
◮ Let P ∈ E(F p 2 ) be a point of order n.
◮ P has embedding degree k = 3, and the Weil/Tate pairings give an efficiently computable isomorphism
◮ In 2000, we asked whether there is an efficiently computable isomorphism ψ : X −→ P .
◮ ECSTR: Elliptic Curve Supersingular Trace Representation
In May 2001, Verheul proved the following: Suppose that there is an efficiently-computable isomorphism ψ from the XTR group X to the order-n subgroup P of E(F p 2 ). Then the Diffie-Hellman problems in X and P are efficiently solvable.
He concludes that his results:
...provide evidence that the multiplicative group of a finite field provides essentially more, and in any case not less, security than the group of points of a supersingular elliptic curve of comparable size. Strong Diffie-Hellman Problem: Given the m + 1 group elements g, g x , g x 2 , . . . , g x m , find a pair (c, h) (where c is a nonzero integer mod n and h is a group element) such that h x+c = g.
Decision Linear Problem:
Given group elements g, g x , g y , g ax , g by and Z, decide whether Z = g a+b .
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Acceptance of Pairing-Based Cryptography
It is surprising that despite the prevailing mistrust of ECC in general, and supersingular elliptic curves in particular, pairing-based cryptography (PBC) was immediately accepted by the research community.
There are four reasons for this:
1. The timing was right -the bitter RSA-ECC rivalry had subsided.
2. PBC was not viewed by commercial organizations as disruptive to their interests.
3. PBC was not viewed by academic researchers as disruptive to their interests.
4. PBC protocols were presented with elaborate security proofs.
-24 NSA: National Security Agency www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/crypto_elliptic_curve.cfm (2005) "The best assured group of new public key techniques is built on the arithmetic of elliptic curves. This paper will outline a case for moving to elliptic curves as a foundation for future Internet security. This case will be based on both the relative security offered by elliptic curves... and the relative performance of these algorithms. While at current security levels elliptic curves do not offer significant benefits over existing public key algorithms, as one scales security upwards over time to meet the evolving threat posed by eavesdroppers and hackers with access to greater computing resources, elliptic curves begin to offer dramatic savings over the old, first generation techniques."
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NSA Suite B, 2005 For the protection of both classified and unclassified National Security Information.
Also for the protection of classified government communications with UK, Canada, and certain other NATO countries.
The only public-key scheme is ECC. One randomly selected elliptic curve over a 256-bit prime field. One randomly selected elliptic curve over a 384-bit prime field. About 1.3 million units of equipment will be replaced over the next 10 years.
Equipment will be used for the next 20-50 years. Recent Developments: ECDLP (2) (Gaudry; 2004) Fully exponential q 2−2/n attack on ECDLP over extension fields F q n for small n (faster than Pollard q n/2 for small n ≥ 3).
(Diem; 2004) Subexponential attack on ECDLP over extension fields F q n for n 2 ≈ log q. (Gaudry, Thériault, Thomé, Diem; Nagao; 2004) Fully exponential q 2−2/g attack for small genus (faster than Pollard for g ≥ 3).
(Diem; 2004) Fully exponential q 2−2/(g−1) attack on the DLP for "sufficiently general" non-hyperelliptic curves of genus g ≥ 3 (faster than Pollard for small g ≥ 3).
(Enge; 2007 ) Subexponential 2 (log q g )
1/3 attack on the DLP for a family of non-hyperelliptic genus-g curves defined over F q .
(Smith; 2008) Fully exponential q attack for about 18% of all genus 3 hyperelliptic curves.
-33
Concluding Remarks
The ECDLP for elliptic curves over prime fields F p and binary fields F 2 m (with m prime) has withstood the test of time.
But, of course, the future is impossible to predict..... Deciding whether to use RSA, ECC, genus-2 hyperelliptic curves, pairing-based cryptography, or a post-quantum public-key system, prime fields or binary fields, random or special parameters, does require speculation about future developments and a lot of faith (and humility). 
